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Smoke in the (Tariff) Water
As the economic crisis deepened and widened, fears of a return to the protectionist spiral of the 1930s become more common. However, an important difference between the 1930s and today is the existence of the World Trade Organization and the legal limits it imposes on the protectionist responses mem...
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Published in: | World economy 2011-02, Vol.34 (2), p.248-264 |
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container_end_page | 264 |
container_issue | 2 |
container_start_page | 248 |
container_title | World economy |
container_volume | 34 |
creator | Foletti, Liliana Fugazza, Marco Nicita, Alessandro Olarreaga, Marcelo |
description | As the economic crisis deepened and widened, fears of a return to the protectionist spiral of the 1930s become more common. However, an important difference between the 1930s and today is the existence of the World Trade Organization and the legal limits it imposes on the protectionist responses members can pursue. The first objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which applied tariffs can be legally raised without violating bound tariff obligations and compare it with what is economically feasible. The second objective is the examination of whether individual countries have taken advantage of these legal tariff hikes as protectionist responses during economic crises, after the creation of the WTO. Results suggest that the policy space left when looking at what is economically possible is indeed quite large. However, in the recent past little of the available policy space has been used by countries suffering from an economic crisis. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01318.x |
format | article |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley; EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; BSC - Ebsco (Business Source Ultimate) |
subjects | Economic conditions Economic Crises Economic crisis Fear Free trade and protection International organizations International trade Left Wing Politics Obligation Protectionism Regulation Studies Tariff Tariff policy Tariffs Trade policy Trade relations Violations Water World Trade Organization WTO |
title | Smoke in the (Tariff) Water |
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