Why not destroy the remaining smallpox virus stocks?

The actions sufficient to contain possible bioterrorist tacks are isolation of patients, and identification and vaccination of all real and potential contacts. [...]despite the fact that prestigious groups have identified research that requires use of live smallpox virus, what little is necessary ca...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Vaccine 2011-04, Vol.29 (16), p.2823-2824
Main Authors: Lane, J. Michael, Poland, Gregory A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Advisory Committees
Allergy and Immunology
Biological & chemical weapons
Biological Specimen Banks
Containment of Biohazards
Ethics
Genomes
Humans
International Cooperation
Laboratories
Manufacturing industry
Politics
Preservation, Biological
Risk
Russia
Smallpox
Smallpox - prevention & control
Smallpox Vaccine - biosynthesis
United States
Vaccines
Variola virus
Weapons
World Health Organization
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Summary:The actions sufficient to contain possible bioterrorist tacks are isolation of patients, and identification and vaccination of all real and potential contacts. [...]despite the fact that prestigious groups have identified research that requires use of live smallpox virus, what little is necessary can be done or approximated using vaccinia, monkeypox, or partial fragments of the smallpox genome. [...]we have banned such weapons as part of our military arsenal, and there is no plausible scenario whereby the US would use biologic weapons such as smallpox in an offensive or defensive posture. The former Deputy Director of the Soviet Union's BioPreparat has written that during the height of the Cold War there existed manufacturing facilities within the Soviet Union capable of producing smallpox virus in quantities of tons [12].
ISSN:0264-410X
1873-2518
DOI:10.1016/j.vaccine.2011.02.081