Individual versus systemic risk and the Regulator's Dilemma

• Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS 2011-08, Vol.108 (31), p.12647-12652
• Main Authors: Beale, Nicholas, Rand, David G, Battey, Heather, Croxson, Karen, May, Robert M, Nowak, Martin A
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Algorithms; assets; Bank assets; Bank capital; Bank failures; banking; Banking crises; Banking regulation; Banks; capital; Cost functions; Costs and Cost Analysis - methods; Costs and Cost Analysis - statistics & numerical data; Economic crisis; Economics - statistics & numerical data; Humans; Income - statistics & numerical data; Minimization of cost; Models, Economic; Portfolio diversification; Regulation of financial institutions; risk; Risk Assessment - methods; Risk Assessment - statistics & numerical data; Risk exposure; Risk Factors; Risk management; Social Sciences; Systemic risk
• ISSN: 0027-8424; 1091-6490
• DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1105882108

The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 exposed critical weaknesses in the financial system. Many proposals for financial reform address the need for systemic regulation—that is, regulation focused on the soundness of the whole financial system and not just that of individual institutions. In this paper, we study one particular problem faced by a systemic regulator: the tension between the distribution of assets that individual banks would like to hold and the distribution across banks that best supports system stability if greater weight is given to avoiding multiple bank failures. By diversifying its risks, a bank lowers its own probability of failure. However, if many banks diversify their risks in similar ways, then the probability of multiple failures can increase. As more banks fail simultaneously, the economic disruption tends to increase disproportionately. We show that, in model systems, the expected systemic cost of multiple failures can be largely explained by two global parameters of risk exposure and diversity, which can be assessed in terms of the risk exposures of individual actors. This observation hints at the possibility of regulatory intervention to promote systemic stability by incentivizing a more diverse diversification among banks. Such intervention offers the prospect of an additional lever in the armory of regulators, potentially allowing some combination of improved system stability and reduced need for additional capital.