The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The British accounting review 2011-09, Vol.43 (3), p.230-246
Main Authors: Setia-Atmaja, Lukas, Haman, Janto, Tanewski, George
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accounting
Agency
Agency theory
Australia
Board independence
Board of directors
Boards of directors
Closely held corporations
Earnings management
Family firms
Family owned businesses
Family ownership
Ownership
Panel data
Studies
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Summary:We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.
ISSN:0890-8389
1095-8347
DOI:10.1016/j.bar.2011.06.006