Third zone revisited

Zone 3 of a step-distance protection scheme has been identified as one of the contributing causes of cascading failures in power systems. The National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued rules, and the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) has discussed recommendations to reduce the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on power delivery 2006-01, Vol.21 (1), p.23-29
Main Authors: Horowitz, S.H., Phadke, A.G.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adaptive relaying
Applied sciences
back-up protection
Backups
blackouts
catastrophic failures
computer relaying
Councils
Design engineering
Disturbances. Regulation. Protection
Electric power generation
Electrical engineering. Electrical power engineering
Electrical power engineering
Exact sciences and technology
hidden failures
Power engineering computing
Power networks and lines
Power system faults
Power system protection
Power system relaying
Power system reliability
Power system stability
Power transmission lines
Protective relaying
Relay
Relay systems
Relaying
Stations
Steady-state
step distance relaying
Tables (data)
third zone
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Description
Summary:Zone 3 of a step-distance protection scheme has been identified as one of the contributing causes of cascading failures in power systems. The National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued rules, and the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) has discussed recommendations to reduce the undesirable operation of this component of the protection chain. It is the purpose of this paper to reexamine the application of zone 3, to describe situations where it can be properly utilized, where it can be removed without reducing the reliability of the system protection and, if used, how it can be modified or set. A table is presented for a variety of station designs and protection schemes including two common local backup relay systems and the associated application of a remote third zone. Finally, the concept of critical locations is introduced which can assist the relay engineer in determining if potential zone 3 undesirable operations are a serious threat to the system and help determine if the expense and difficulty of removing zone 3 or modifying the relay or its associated station is justified.
ISSN:0885-8977
1937-4208
DOI:10.1109/TPWRD.2005.860244