Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties

We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting to allow for k ≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party equilibria when k = 2 and show that the polic...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2011-01, Vol.36 (1), p.83-104
Main Authors: Brusco, Sandro, Roy, Jaideep
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Candidates
Citizens
Competition
Cost of entry
Economic models
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elections
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Extreme Right
Extremism
Extremist parties
Extremists
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Left Wing Politics
Liberalism
Median voter
Median voter model
Nash equilibrium
Original Paper
Platform
Political candidates
Political economy
Political extremism
Political parties
Public Finance
Right wing parties
Right Wing Politics
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Studies
Uncertainty
Voters
Voting
Voting behaviour
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Summary:We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting to allow for k ≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party equilibria when k = 2 and show that the policies of the two parties in any such equilibrium are not only divergent but that the parties are extremist: when the political mood is left-wing, the left-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the left of the left-wing median voter, while when the political mood is right-wing, the right-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the right of the right-wing median voter. We then provide conditions under which such equilibria remain robust for an arbitrary value of k.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-010-0467-4