Intermediation in Networks

I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic model of multilateral bargaining in which players compete on different routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency and t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Policy File 2015
Main Author: Siedlarek, Jan-Peter
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic policy
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Online Access:Request full text
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Summary:I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic model of multilateral bargaining in which players compete on different routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency and the impact of network structure on payoffs. There is never too little trade but there may be an inefficiency through too much trade in states where delay would be efficient. With homogeneous trade surplus the payoffs for players that are not essential to a trade opportunity go to zero as trade frictions vanish.