Climate Policy and Inequality in Two-Dimensional Political Competition

This paper examines how income inequality can affect the polarization of heterogeneous party platforms on climate policy (here: carbon tax). The implied consequences for the uncertainty of climate policy can be relevant for risk-averse investors in "green" technologies. Households are hete...

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Published in:Policy File 2019
Main Author: Marz, Waldemar
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CESifo Group Munich
Economic policy
Environment
Social conditions & trends
Taxation
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description This paper examines how income inequality can affect the polarization of heterogeneous party platforms on climate policy (here: carbon tax). The implied consequences for the uncertainty of climate policy can be relevant for risk-averse investors in "green" technologies. Households are heterogeneous with respect to income and preferences for environmentalism and preferred redistribution. A static gametheoretic model of two-dimensional political competition on a carbon tax (with distributional implications) and an income tax is combined with a model of a carbonintensive economy. For a higher inequality of pre-tax income and/or a higher salience of the issue of redistribution, polarization of the parties' carbon tax proposals in the equilibrium can increase - even if the income tax is used to counteract the increase in income inequality. This result does not depend on the progressivity of the carbon-tax revenue recycling mechanism.
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subjects CESifo Group Munich
Economic policy
Environment
Social conditions & trends
Taxation
title Climate Policy and Inequality in Two-Dimensional Political Competition
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