Revisiting RAND's Russia Wargames After the Invasion of Ukraine -- Summary and Implications

• Published in: Policy File 2023
• Main Authors: Gentile, Gian, Jackson, John C, Mueller, Karl P, Barnett, D Sean, Hvizda, Mark, Martin, Bradley, Ochmanek, David A, Reach, Clint, Wilson, Barry
• Format: Report
• Language: English
• Subjects: International cooperation; International relations; Military exercises; War

In mid-2022, after the opening months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a group of RAND Corporation researchers conducted an internal series of discussions to examine the recent events of the Russia-Ukraine War. All the participants had been involved in the design and execution of tabletop exercise (TTX) wargames involving Russia during the past eight years, mostly centered on the challenges facing a North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense of the Baltic states. The focus of their deliberations was understanding the reasons for the similarities and differences between how Russian forces had fared in those games and the relatively poor real-world performance of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. This report summarizes the unclassified conclusions of the discussions that followed a comprehensive review of wargaming methods and analysis used. The authors also identify implications for future wargaming and analysis of potential conflicts involving major power adversaries. This is not an in-depth research report about Russian military capabilities or the war in Ukraine but rather the proceedings of an internal set of discussions from experienced wargamers reflecting on recent events. The differences and the similarities between the post-2014 Russia wargames and actual events in Ukraine are striking In real life, Russian forces did not follow their planning principles, although they did achieve overwhelming superiority in some battles. In the Baltic wargames, Russian ground forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and were consistently on the favorable side of even larger imbalances of heavy armor and artillery firepower. Having expected Ukrainian resistance to collapse quickly, the Russian offensive was neither organized nor prepared to deal with staunch opposition; the Baltic games assumed that Moscow would prepare more seriously for a war against NATO. In contrast, NATO countries were conspicuously united and energetic in helping Ukraine even though it was not an Alliance member.