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Specificity of Learning a Sport Skill to the Visual Condition of Acquisition
The authors' main purpose was to determine whether learning of a real-world sport skill (basketball free throws) is specific to the sources of afferent visual information available during practice. Twenty-eight male high school students (inexperienced in the experimental task) were randomly ass...
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Published in: | Journal of motor behavior 2014-01, Vol.46 (1), p.17-23 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The authors' main purpose was to determine whether learning of a real-world sport skill (basketball free throws) is specific to the sources of afferent visual information available during practice. Twenty-eight male high school students (inexperienced in the experimental task) were randomly assigned to a full vision or target only vision group. Participants trained under full vision or target only condition for 15 sessions. Following training, in immediate tests, they were examined under full vision and then under target only conditions. Ten days later, in delayed tests, they performed the task under full vision and then under target only conditions. Results showed both groups performed the task similarly across the experimental period. Interestingly, it was found that immediate and delayed retention performance is specific to the training visual context. The groups' performances dropped significantly when we tested them at a visual condition that differed from what they had experienced while learning the task. Performance of the task seemed to have integrated with the visual information available during the task acquisition. These findings provide evidence for the specificity of practice hypothesis in the field of motor learning and control. |
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ISSN: | 0022-2895 1940-1027 |
DOI: | 10.1080/00222895.2013.838935 |