Evolution of Cooperation in Multiplex Networks

We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part in several layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. This multiplex of interdependent networks accounts for the different kind of social ties each individual has. By coupling the evolutionary dynami...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Scientific reports 2012-08, Vol.2 (1), p.620-620, Article 620
Main Authors: Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús, Reinares, Irene, Arenas, Alex, Floría, Luis Mario
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
639/705/1042
639/766/483/640
639/766/530
Algorithms
Biological Evolution
Computer Simulation
Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
Evolution
Game Theory
Humanities and Social Sciences
Humans
Models, Biological
multidisciplinary
Nonlinear Dynamics
Poisson Distribution
Prisoner's dilemma
Science
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Summary:We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part in several layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. This multiplex of interdependent networks accounts for the different kind of social ties each individual has. By coupling the evolutionary dynamics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game in each of the networks, we show that the resilience of cooperative behaviors for extremely large values of the temptation to defect is enhanced by the multiplex structure. Furthermore, this resilience is intrinsically related to a non-trivial organization of cooperation across the network layers, thus providing a new way out for cooperation to survive in structured populations.
ISSN:2045-2322
2045-2322
DOI:10.1038/srep00620