Elite Capture and Corruption in two Villages in Bengkulu Province, Sumatra

This paper examines leadership, elite capture and corruption in two villages in Sumatra. It compares implementation and outcomes of several conservation and development projects in the context of democratization and decentralization reforms introduced in Indonesia since 1998. In examining aspects of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Human ecology : an interdisciplinary journal 2016-06, Vol.44 (3), p.287-300
Main Author: Lucas, Anton
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anthropology
Area planning & development
case studies
CLUSTER ON REVISITING LEADERSHIP, ELITE CAPTURE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: CASE STUDIES FROM INDONESIA
Conservation
Corruption
Cross cutting
Decentralization
Development projects
Elites
Environmental Management
Forest conservation
Forest management
Forest preservation
Forest products
Forest resources
Forestry development
friction
Geography
Government corruption
Highlands
Indonesia
Leadership
Management
National parks
planning
politics
Project management
Public officials
Social Sciences
Sociology
Towns
Villages
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Summary:This paper examines leadership, elite capture and corruption in two villages in Sumatra. It compares implementation and outcomes of several conservation and development projects in the context of democratization and decentralization reforms introduced in Indonesia since 1998. In examining aspects of elite control and elite capture, this paper focuses on the activities of local elites, particularly village officials, who use their positions to monopolize planning and management of projects that were explicitly intended to incorporate participatory and accountability features. While elites' use of authority and influence to benefit personally from their roles clearly reflects elite capture, there are nonetheless members of elite groups in these case studies who use their control of projects to broad community benefit. In both villages there is considerable friction between villagers and elites as well as among members of the local elite themselves over control of local resources. Differences in the structure of these cross-cutting internal relationships and of ties between local authorities and outside government and non-government agents largely explain the differences in degree of elite capture and its outcomes in the two cases.
ISSN:0300-7839
1572-9915
DOI:10.1007/s10745-016-9837-6