Associative Learning of Social Value in Dynamic Groups

Although humans live in societies that regularly demand engaging with multiple people simultaneously, little is known about social learning in group settings. In two experiments, we combined a Pavlovian learning framework with dyadic economic games to test whether blocking mechanisms support value-b...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychological science 2017-08, Vol.28 (8), p.1160-1170
Main Authors: FeldmanHall, Oriel, Dunsmoor, Joseph E., Kroes, Marijn C. W., Lackovic, Sandra, Phelps, Elizabeth A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adult
Altruism
Association Learning - physiology
Associative learning
Bias
Blocking
Conditioning, Classical - physiology
Dictators
Expectations
Female
Games
Group Processes
Humans
Learning
Male
Money
Robbery
Social interaction
Social learning
Social Values
Value
Violations
Young Adult
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Summary:Although humans live in societies that regularly demand engaging with multiple people simultaneously, little is known about social learning in group settings. In two experiments, we combined a Pavlovian learning framework with dyadic economic games to test whether blocking mechanisms support value-based social learning in the gain (altruistic dictators) and loss (greedy robbers) domains. Subjects first learned about an altruistic dictator, who subsequently made altruistic splits collectively with a partner. Results revealed that because the presence of the dictator already predicted the outcome, subjects did not learn to associate value with the partner. This social blocking effect was not observed in the loss domain: A kind robber's partner, who could steal all the subjects' money but stole little, acquired highly positive value—which biased subjects' subsequent behavior. These findings reveal how Pavlovian mechanisms support efficient social learning, while also demonstrating that violations of social expectations can attenuate how readily these mechanisms are recruited.
ISSN:0956-7976
1467-9280
DOI:10.1177/0956797617706394