Pay-off scarcity causes evolution of risk-aversion and extreme altruism

All organisms descend from populations with limited resources, so it is clear why evolution should select strategies that win resources at the expense of competitors. Less obvious is how altruistic behaviours evolve, whereby an individual helps others despite expense to itself. Modelling simple agen...

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Published in:Scientific reports 2018-10, Vol.8 (1), p.16074-10, Article 16074
Main Author: Evans, R. M. L.
Format: Article
Language:English
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631/114/2397
631/181/2468
639/766/530/2804
Altruism
Aversion
Evolution
Game theory
Humanities and Social Sciences
multidisciplinary
Rare resources
Risk aversion
Risk reduction
Science
Science (multidisciplinary)
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description All organisms descend from populations with limited resources, so it is clear why evolution should select strategies that win resources at the expense of competitors. Less obvious is how altruistic behaviours evolve, whereby an individual helps others despite expense to itself. Modelling simple agents using evolutionary game theory, it is shown that steady states of extreme altruism can evolve when pay-offs are very rare compared with death. In these states, agents give away most of their wealth. A new theorem for general evolutionary models shows that, when pay-offs are rare, evolution no longer selects strategies to maximize income (average pay-off), but to minimize the risk of missing-out entirely on a rare resource. Principles revealed by the model are widely applicable, where the game represents rare life-changing events: disasters or gluts.
doi_str_mv 10.1038/s41598-018-34384-w
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subjects 631/114/2397
631/181/2468
639/766/530/2804
Altruism
Aversion
Evolution
Game theory
Humanities and Social Sciences
multidisciplinary
Rare resources
Risk aversion
Risk reduction
Science
Science (multidisciplinary)
title Pay-off scarcity causes evolution of risk-aversion and extreme altruism
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