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An Analysis of Decision under Risk in Rats

In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published a ground-breaking paper titled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” which presented a behavioral economic theory that accounted for the ways in which humans deviate from economists’ normative workhorse model, Expected Utility Theo...

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Published in:Current biology 2019-06, Vol.29 (12), p.2066-2074.e5
Main Authors: Constantinople, Christine M., Piet, Alex T., Brody, Carlos D.
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description In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published a ground-breaking paper titled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” which presented a behavioral economic theory that accounted for the ways in which humans deviate from economists’ normative workhorse model, Expected Utility Theory [1, 2]. For example, people exhibit probability distortion (they overweight low probabilities), loss aversion (losses loom larger than gains), and reference dependence (outcomes are evaluated as gains or losses relative to an internal reference point). We found that rats exhibited many of these same biases, using a task in which rats chose between guaranteed and probabilistic rewards. However, prospect theory assumes stable preferences in the absence of learning, an assumption at odds with alternative frameworks such as animal learning theory and reinforcement learning [3–7]. Rats also exhibited trial history effects, consistent with ongoing learning. A reinforcement learning model in which state-action values were updated by the subjective value of outcomes according to prospect theory reproduced rats’ nonlinear utility and probability weighting functions and also captured trial-by-trial learning dynamics. •A novel task enables application of core behavioral economic approaches in rodents•Like humans, rats exhibit nonlinear utility and probability weighting•Rats also exhibit trial history effects, consistent with ongoing learning•A reinforcement learning model incorporating subjective value accounts for the data Constantinople et al. apply prospect theory, the predominant economic theory of decision-making under risk, to rats. Rats exhibit signatures of both prospect theory and reinforcement learning. The authors present a model that integrates these frameworks, accounting for rats’ nonlinear econometric functions and also trial-by-trial learning.
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subjects Animals
computational model
Decision Making
Learning
Male
Probability
prospect theory
rat behavior
Rats - psychology
Rats, Long-Evans
Rats, Wistar
reinforcement learning
Reinforcement, Psychology
Reward
Risk-Taking
subjective value
title An Analysis of Decision under Risk in Rats
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