High-value decisions are fast and accurate, inconsistent with diminishing value sensitivity

• Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS 2022-02, Vol.119 (6), p.1
• Main Authors: Shevlin, Blair R K, Smith, Stephanie M, Hausfeld, Jan, Krajbich, Ian
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Biological Sciences; Decisions; Diminishing marginal utility; Drift rate; Models, Theoretical; Psychology; Sequential sampling; Social Sciences; Utility theory; Weber-Fechner law
• ISSN: 0027-8424; 1091-6490; 1091-6490
• DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2101508119

It is a widely held belief that people's choices are less sensitive to changes in value as value increases. For example, the subjective difference between $11 and $12 is believed to be smaller than between $1 and $2. This idea is consistent with applications of the Weber-Fechner Law and divisive normalization to value-based choice and with psychological interpretations of diminishing marginal utility. According to random utility theory in economics, smaller subjective differences predict less accurate choices. Meanwhile, in the context of sequential sampling models in psychology, smaller subjective differences also predict longer response times. Based on these models, we would predict decisions between high-value options to be slower and less accurate. In contrast, some have argued on normative grounds that choices between high-value options should be made with less caution, leading to faster and less accurate choices. Here, we model the dynamics of the choice process across three different choice domains, accounting for both discriminability and response caution. Contrary to predictions, we mostly observe faster and more accurate decisions (i.e., higher drift rates) between high-value options. We also observe that when participants are alerted about incoming high-value decisions, they exert more caution and not less. We rule out several explanations for these results, using tasks with both subjective and objective values. These results cast doubt on the notion that increasing value reduces discriminability.