On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa

Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustai...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences Biological sciences, 1998-07, Vol.265 (1402), p.1237-1244
Main Authors: Michael Mesterton-Gibbons, E.J. Milner-Gulland
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Common Property Resources
Community-Based Management
Cooperative Behaviour
Game Theory
Monitoring
Wildlife Conservation
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563
container_end_page 1244
container_issue 1402
container_start_page 1237
container_title Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences
container_volume 265
creator Michael Mesterton-Gibbons
E.J. Milner-Gulland
description Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community benefits for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identified for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.
doi_str_mv 10.1098/rspb.1998.0425
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>istex_royal</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_royalsociety_journals_10_1098_rspb_1998_0425</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>ark_67375_V84_W1V27Q7L_1</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kEuP0zAUhSMEEsPAlrX_QIqfic0CMYx4SZWG57C8ihO7vUMSR3baofx63BaNVCFmZVs-5zv3nqJ4zuiCUaNfxDTZBTNGL6jk6kFxxmTNSm6UfFicUVPxUkvFHxdPUrqhlBql1VnRXY1kXjuS5tjMboVtvjUWe5x3JHgyhBHnEHFcvSQ4TD22zYxhTMSHSNoQJpdtuHXkFvuuR-_IFMMqNsPgEsGRXPiYLU-LR77pk3v29zwvvr97--3yQ7m8ev_x8mJZtrIyqmQmH1w4KillulaslVoYbrmU0oqq8lZbWXFPpagUt76j1ltvrGRdQ4WqxHnx6sidNnZwXevGvFUPU8ShiTsIDcLpz4hrWIUtsEobpnUGLI6ANoaUovN3XkZhXzLsS4Z9ybAvORvS0RDDLm8WWnTzDm7CJo75CV--fnqTxXTLK4VMUg5UC0ZrJqWA3zgdcHsBZAFgShsHB9lpzL-p4r7U_85aHl2YZvfrbrMm_oSqFrWCay3hB7vm9ed6CSzrXx_1a1ytbzE6OIk70NswzrnLw_iHwRkXNfhNn1vvfEbwexFhN8VkT93iD7bs4OA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa</title><source>PubMed (Medline)</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection</source><source>Royal Society Publishing Jisc Collections Royal Society Journals Read &amp; Publish Transitional Agreement 2025 (reading list)</source><creator>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons ; E.J. Milner-Gulland</creator><creatorcontrib>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons ; E.J. Milner-Gulland</creatorcontrib><description>Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community benefits for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identified for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0962-8452</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1471-2954</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1098/rspb.1998.0425</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>The Royal Society</publisher><subject>Common Property Resources ; Community-Based Management ; Cooperative Behaviour ; Game Theory ; Monitoring ; Wildlife Conservation</subject><ispartof>Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences, 1998-07, Vol.265 (1402), p.1237-1244</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1689188/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1689188/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,727,780,784,885,27924,27925,53791,53793</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>E.J. Milner-Gulland</creatorcontrib><title>On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa</title><title>Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences</title><description>Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community benefits for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identified for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.</description><subject>Common Property Resources</subject><subject>Community-Based Management</subject><subject>Cooperative Behaviour</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Monitoring</subject><subject>Wildlife Conservation</subject><issn>0962-8452</issn><issn>1471-2954</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1998</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kEuP0zAUhSMEEsPAlrX_QIqfic0CMYx4SZWG57C8ihO7vUMSR3baofx63BaNVCFmZVs-5zv3nqJ4zuiCUaNfxDTZBTNGL6jk6kFxxmTNSm6UfFicUVPxUkvFHxdPUrqhlBql1VnRXY1kXjuS5tjMboVtvjUWe5x3JHgyhBHnEHFcvSQ4TD22zYxhTMSHSNoQJpdtuHXkFvuuR-_IFMMqNsPgEsGRXPiYLU-LR77pk3v29zwvvr97--3yQ7m8ev_x8mJZtrIyqmQmH1w4KillulaslVoYbrmU0oqq8lZbWXFPpagUt76j1ltvrGRdQ4WqxHnx6sidNnZwXevGvFUPU8ShiTsIDcLpz4hrWIUtsEobpnUGLI6ANoaUovN3XkZhXzLsS4Z9ybAvORvS0RDDLm8WWnTzDm7CJo75CV--fnqTxXTLK4VMUg5UC0ZrJqWA3zgdcHsBZAFgShsHB9lpzL-p4r7U_85aHl2YZvfrbrMm_oSqFrWCay3hB7vm9ed6CSzrXx_1a1ytbzE6OIk70NswzrnLw_iHwRkXNfhNn1vvfEbwexFhN8VkT93iD7bs4OA</recordid><startdate>19980707</startdate><enddate>19980707</enddate><creator>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons</creator><creator>E.J. Milner-Gulland</creator><general>The Royal Society</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19980707</creationdate><title>On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa</title><author>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons ; E.J. Milner-Gulland</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1998</creationdate><topic>Common Property Resources</topic><topic>Community-Based Management</topic><topic>Cooperative Behaviour</topic><topic>Game Theory</topic><topic>Monitoring</topic><topic>Wildlife Conservation</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>E.J. Milner-Gulland</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Michael Mesterton-Gibbons</au><au>E.J. Milner-Gulland</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa</atitle><jtitle>Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences</jtitle><date>1998-07-07</date><risdate>1998</risdate><volume>265</volume><issue>1402</issue><spage>1237</spage><epage>1244</epage><pages>1237-1244</pages><issn>0962-8452</issn><eissn>1471-2954</eissn><abstract>Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community benefits for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identified for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.</abstract><pub>The Royal Society</pub><doi>10.1098/rspb.1998.0425</doi><tpages>8</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0962-8452
ispartof Proceedings of the Royal Society. B, Biological sciences, 1998-07, Vol.265 (1402), p.1237-1244
issn 0962-8452
1471-2954
language eng
recordid cdi_royalsociety_journals_10_1098_rspb_1998_0425
source PubMed (Medline); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Royal Society Publishing Jisc Collections Royal Society Journals Read & Publish Transitional Agreement 2025 (reading list)
subjects Common Property Resources
Community-Based Management
Cooperative Behaviour
Game Theory
Monitoring
Wildlife Conservation
title On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-01T09%3A36%3A17IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-istex_royal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=On%20the%20strategic%20stability%20of%20monitoring:%20implications%20for%20cooperative%20wildlife%20programmes%20in%20Africa&rft.jtitle=Proceedings%20of%20the%20Royal%20Society.%20B,%20Biological%20sciences&rft.au=Michael%20Mesterton-Gibbons&rft.date=1998-07-07&rft.volume=265&rft.issue=1402&rft.spage=1237&rft.epage=1244&rft.pages=1237-1244&rft.issn=0962-8452&rft.eissn=1471-2954&rft_id=info:doi/10.1098/rspb.1998.0425&rft_dat=%3Cistex_royal%3Eark_67375_V84_W1V27Q7L_1%3C/istex_royal%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-1946923e040018751c48392b2444b366fb8b462f043652bfd0bfbf9b41da03563%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true