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The future of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control
Nuclear arms control has long made contributions to U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian security, but the current regime is at risk. The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty may be headed for collapse. Both the United States and Russia are modernizing their strategic forces, and the fate of the 20...
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description | Nuclear arms control has long made contributions to U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian security, but the current regime is at risk. The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty may be headed for collapse. Both the United States and Russia are modernizing their strategic forces, and the fate of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is unclear. In the unlikely case that the sides are prepared to go beyond New START, there are ways to address further reductions and related issues. A collapse of the arms control regime, on the other hand, would mean the end of constraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, a significant loss of transparency, and potential costs to U.S. security. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1063/1.5009206 |
format | conference_proceeding |
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fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0094-243X |
ispartof | AIP Conference Proceedings, 2017, Vol.1898 (1) |
issn | 0094-243X 1551-7616 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_scitation_primary_10_1063_1_5009206 |
source | American Institute of Physics:Jisc Collections:Transitional Journals Agreement 2021-23 (Reading list) |
subjects | Arms control & disarmament Binding energy Collapse Modernization Security |
title | The future of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control |
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