Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters' Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election

This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed:...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of elections, public opinion and parties public opinion and parties, 2014-01, Vol.24 (4), p.473-492
Main Author: Fredén, Annika
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Christians
coalitions
elections
Electoral results
Insurance
Parliamentary elections
Political Science
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
PR systems
proportional representation
Samhällsvetenskap
Social Sciences
Statsvetenskap
Statsvetenskap (exklusive studier av offentlig förvaltning och globaliseringsstudier)
strategic
Strategic behaviour
Sweden
threshold
thresholds
Voters
voting
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Summary:This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition.
ISSN:1745-7289
1745-7297
1745-7297
DOI:10.1080/17457289.2013.872118