Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Rents to Relatives of Top Politicians

We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Economic journal (London) 2017, Vol.127, p.F495
Main Authors: Folke, Olle, Persson, Torsten, Rickne, Johanna
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election-winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents' municipality to work.
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
DOI:10.1111/ecoj.12494