The preemption problem

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the "preemption problem." In the recent literature, there are...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2019-02, Vol.176 (2), p.351-365
Main Authors: Johansson, Jens, Risberg, Olle
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Filosofi
Harm
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Preemption
Theory
Well-being
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Summary:According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the "preemption problem." In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-017-1019-x