Evaluating Vacancy Referrals and the Roles of Sanctions and Sickness Absence

Abstract Job vacancy referrals are a common active labour market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat eff...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Economic journal (London) 2019-11, Vol.129 (624), p.3292-3322
Main Authors: van den Berg, Gerard J, Hofmann, Barbara, Uhlendorff, Arne
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic policy
Economic theory
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
Illnesses
Insurance agencies
Labor market
Moral hazard
Referrals
Sanctions
Sick leave
Unemployment
Unemployment insurance
Vacancies
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Abstract Job vacancy referrals are a common active labour market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat effect of sanctions. We study effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on unemployment duration and job match quality. We find that a vacancy referral increases the transition rate into work. We also find a positive effect of a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick.
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
1468-0297
DOI:10.1093/ej/uez032