The weight of reasons

This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2023-09, Vol.180 (9), p.2573-2596
Main Authors: Fogal, Daniel, Risberg, Olle
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Normativity
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Reasons
Support
Weighing
Weight
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Summary:This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively fundamental, views which analyze reasons as evidence concerning what one ought to do, views which analyze reasons in terms of good reasoning, and views which analyze reasons as explanations of ought-facts, fittingness-facts, or goodness-facts.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-023-01974-y