Participation

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) whe...

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Published in:The American economic review 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1211-1237
Main Authors: Charness, Gary, Dufwenberg, Martin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Access to information
Behavior
Behavior modeling
Behavioural economics
Blame
Collaboration
Communication
Communication economics
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Business
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Emotions
Employment
Experimental economics
Game theory
Games
Guilt
Human capital
Information economics
Lying
Observed choices
Opportunistic behavior
Participation
Studies
Talent agents & managers
Talent management
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cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-9355d038b87f11a1c8e6257ff8de04740b4ae919f8c48308eb6fa96d31dd97fe3
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-9355d038b87f11a1c8e6257ff8de04740b4ae919f8c48308eb6fa96d31dd97fe3
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container_title The American economic review
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description We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame.
doi_str_mv 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211
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source EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Social Science Premium Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; American Economic Association; JSTOR Archival Journals
subjects Access to information
Behavior
Behavior modeling
Behavioural economics
Blame
Collaboration
Communication
Communication economics
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Business
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Emotions
Employment
Experimental economics
Game theory
Games
Guilt
Human capital
Information economics
Lying
Observed choices
Opportunistic behavior
Participation
Studies
Talent agents & managers
Talent management
title Participation
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