Insurance strategic considerations in coalition-oriented systems: A consideration set model approach

During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Electoral studies 2019-02, Vol.57, p.302-308
Main Authors: Fredén, Annika, Sohlberg, Jacob
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citizens
Coalitions
Consideration set
consideration sets
Decision making
Incentives
Insurance
National elections
Panel data
Political campaigns
Political Science
Small parties
Statsvetenskap
Strategic
Strategic voting
Voters
voting
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Summary:During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using panel data from the Swedish National Election Studies of 2014. In line with our argument, we demonstrate that the insurance strategy was prevalent earlier in the decision-making process, when forming the consideration set.
ISSN:0261-3794
1873-6890
1873-6890
DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.008