An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept

For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is ‘strategically irrelevant’, then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solut...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2019-09, Vol.117, p.316-321
Main Author: Voorneveld, Mark
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Axiomatization
Nash equilibrium
Solution concept
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is ‘strategically irrelevant’, then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.011