Downsian Competition When No Policy is Unbeatable

This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing policy platforms and observe eachother's choices, for one party to change position so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of game theory 2006-08, Vol.34 (2), p.273-284
Main Author: Roine, Jesper
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Electoral campaigning
Equilibrium
Equilibrium theory
Game theory
Games of strategy
Mathematical models
Political economy
Political theory
Studies
Tax rates
Voting
Voting behaviour
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing policy platforms and observe eachother's choices, for one party to change position so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggests that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-006-0020-y