Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq

We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of political economy 2011-08, Vol.119 (4), p.766-819
Main Authors: Berman, Eli, Shapiro, Jacob N., Felter, Joseph H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Communities
Counterinsurgency
Economic theory
Experimental methods
Information sharing
Insurgency
Iraq
Marginal costs
Middle East
Panel data
Political behaviour
Political economy
Political violence
Postwar reconstruction
Rebellions
Religious terrorism
Spending
Studies
Sunni
Violence
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory’s predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the “surge” began in 2007.
ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/661983