English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England

The literature on distributive politics suggests that politicians have incentives to engage in targeted spending especially in decentralized political systems with weak parties and candidate-centered elections. We argue that in centralized political systems with party-centered elections parties use...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2015-07, Vol.77 (3), p.805-817
Main Authors: Fouirnaies, Alexander, Mutlu-Eren, Hande
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bias
Central government
Councils
Credit
Decentralization
Elections
Expenditures
Government
Government grants
Government performance
Government spending
Grants
Incentives
Intergovernmental relations
Local elections
Local government
Money
Partisanship
Political parties
Political partisanship
Political systems
Political theory
Politicians
Voting
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Summary:The literature on distributive politics suggests that politicians have incentives to engage in targeted spending especially in decentralized political systems with weak parties and candidate-centered elections. We argue that in centralized political systems with party-centered elections parties use intergovernmental transfers to advance their electoral fortune via performance spillovers across different levels of government. On the basis of a new data set on partisan composition of local councils in England and grants allocated by the central government during 1992–2012, and using a difference-in-difference approach, we provide evidence that governments allocate up to 17% more money to local councils controlled by their “own” party. Furthermore, we show that the effect is strongest closer to local election years, in local councils where institutions facilitate credit claiming, and in swing councils.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1086/681563