The Design of Debt-Clearing Markets: Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Preindustrial Europe

We examine the evolution of the decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms that were in use throughout Europe from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century; in particular, we explore the clearing of nontradable or limited-tradable debts such as bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of political economy 2017-12, Vol.125 (6), p.1991-2037
Main Authors: Börner, Lars, Hatfield, John William
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
13th century
18th century
Algorithms
Clearing
Debt
Decentralization
Economic models
Economic theory
Markets
Merchants
Political economy
Robustness
Studies
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Summary:We examine the evolution of the decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms that were in use throughout Europe from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century; in particular, we explore the clearing of nontradable or limited-tradable debts such as bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse mechanisms and show that the specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre, skontrieren, or virement des parties, used by merchants in this period, were efficient in specific historical contexts. Our analysis contributes to the understanding of these mechanisms during late medieval and early modern fairs and their robustness during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/694288