Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

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Published in:The Journal of political economy 2018-02, Vol.126 (1), p.107-149
Main Authors: Bouton, Laurent, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, Malherbe, Frédéric
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision making
Dominance
Pareto optimum
Political economy
Power
State court decisions
Studies
Vetoes
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description We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; University of Chicago Press Journals; EBSCO_EconLit with Full Text（美国经济学会全文数据库）
subjects Decision making
Dominance
Pareto optimum
Political economy
Power
State court decisions
Studies
Vetoes
title Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power
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