Loading…
Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process
Recent discussions in the philosophy of biology have brought into question some fundamental assumptions regarding evolutionary processes, natural selection in particular. Some authors argue that natural selection is nothing but a population-level, statistical consequence of lower-level events (Matth...
Saved in:
Published in: | The British journal for the philosophy of science 2006-12, Vol.57 (4), p.627-653 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Recent discussions in the philosophy of biology have brought into question some fundamental assumptions regarding evolutionary processes, natural selection in particular. Some authors argue that natural selection is nothing but a population-level, statistical consequence of lower-level events (Matthen and Ariew [2002]; Walsh et al. [2002]). On this view, natural selection itself does not involve forces. Other authors reject this purely statistical, population-level account for an individual-level, causal account of natural selection (Bouchard and Rosenberg [2004]). I argue that each of these positions is right in one way, but wrong in another; natural selection indeed takes place at the level of populations, but it is a causal process nonetheless. IntroductionA brief justification of population-level causality2.1 Frequency-dependent selection2.2 Accounts of causationThe montane willow leaf beetle: a causal storyThe montane willow leaf beetle: a population-level story4.1 Response to ‘naïve individualism’4.2 Response to ‘sophisticated individualism’Conclusion |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0007-0882 1464-3537 |
DOI: | 10.1093/bjps/axl025 |