Election-driven weakening of deforestation control in the Brazilian Amazon

•We present a novel interpretation for episodic high deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon.•In many ministries, between 40% and 50% of the staff is renewed after administration shifts.•This vulnerability of the Brazilian state is arguably an important driver of illegal activities in the Amazon...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Land use policy 2015-02, Vol.43, p.111-118
Main Authors: Rodrigues-Filho, Saulo, Verburg, René, Bursztyn, Marcel, Lindoso, Diego, Debortoli, Nathan, Vilhena, Andréa M.G.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Amazon
Amazon region
Brazil
Deforestation
dynamics
Election effect
Elections
environment
Foreign exchange rates
frontier
governance
Migration
Political driver
Prices
Regulation
Surveillance
Sustainability
Threats
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Summary:•We present a novel interpretation for episodic high deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon.•In many ministries, between 40% and 50% of the staff is renewed after administration shifts.•This vulnerability of the Brazilian state is arguably an important driver of illegal activities in the Amazon.•We show that years with high deforestation coincide with presidential elections, resulting in episodic administrative inefficiency. Commodity prices, exchange rate, infrastructural projects and migration patterns are known and important drivers of Amazon deforestation, but cannot solely explain the high rates observed in 1995 and 2003–2004 in six Brazilian Amazon states. Deforestation predictions using those widely applied drivers can underestimate deforestation rates by as much as 50%. We show that years with the highest deforestation rates also correlate with large administrative shifts caused by presidential elections which results in periods of managerial instability associated with episodic inefficiency, leading to weak institutions unable to properly combat illegal deforestation. Although surveillance and regulatory action plans to combat deforestation have held back deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon since 2005, our results suggest that environmental management institutions should be aware such administration shifts set a burden on the policy targets associated with conservation policies. Institutional vulnerability immediately after major elections is an acknowledged fact in Brazil, though it has been mostly disregarded as an indicator of ecological threat.
ISSN:0264-8377
1873-5754
DOI:10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.11.002