Library Catalogue Plus

APA (7th ed.) Citation

Lippi, F. (1999). Central bank independence, targets and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi: Political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy. Edward Elgar.

Chicago Style (17th ed.) Citation

Lippi, Francesco. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility : Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy / Francesco Lippi: Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999.

MLA (9th ed.) Citation

Lippi, Francesco. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility : Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy / Francesco Lippi: Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy. Edward Elgar, 1999.