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A note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly
The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R&D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R&D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R&...
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| Format: | Default Article |
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1999
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2134/2044 |
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| Summary: | The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R&D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R&D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R&D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value. |
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