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Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition

We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist’s investment is known to result in subsidy inflation,two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host...

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Main Authors: Ben Ferrett, Ian Wooton
Format: Default Article
Published: 2010
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2134/23373
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author Ben Ferrett
Ian Wooton
author_facet Ben Ferrett
Ian Wooton
author_sort Ben Ferrett (1250850)
collection Figshare
description We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist’s investment is known to result in subsidy inflation,two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non-cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co-located production,creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country-size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country.
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institution Loughborough University
publishDate 2010
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spelling rr-article-94938622010-01-01T00:00:00Z Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition Ben Ferrett (1250850) Ian Wooton (7195058) Other economics not elsewhere classified untagged Economics Economics not elsewhere classified We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist’s investment is known to result in subsidy inflation,two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non-cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co-located production,creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country-size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country. 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z Text Journal contribution 2134/23373 https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Competing_for_a_duopoly_international_trade_and_tax_competition/9493862 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
spellingShingle Other economics not elsewhere classified
untagged
Economics
Economics not elsewhere classified
Ben Ferrett
Ian Wooton
Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title_full Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title_fullStr Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title_full_unstemmed Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title_short Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
title_sort competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition
topic Other economics not elsewhere classified
untagged
Economics
Economics not elsewhere classified
url https://hdl.handle.net/2134/23373