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Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics

In this paper I shall consider two related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly, Gödel’s paradox which leads to a contradiction within mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of completeness and consistency established by Gödel...

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Main Author: Fenner Tanswell
Format: Default Book chapter
Published: 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2134/9589094.v1
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author Fenner Tanswell
author_facet Fenner Tanswell
author_sort Fenner Tanswell (5731730)
collection Figshare
description In this paper I shall consider two related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly, Gödel’s paradox which leads to a contradiction within mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of completeness and consistency established by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. By bringing in considerations from the philosophy of mathematical practice on informal proofs, I suggest that we should add to the two axes of completeness and consistency a third axis of formality and informality. I use this perspective to respond to the arguments for the inconsistency of mathematics made by Beall and Priest, presenting problems with the assumptions needed concerning formalisation, the unity of informal mathematics and the relation between the formal and informal.
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Book chapter
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institution Loughborough University
publishDate 2016
record_format Figshare
spelling rr-article-95890942016-12-03T00:00:00Z Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics Fenner Tanswell (5731730) Formal system Formal language Mathematical reasoning Mathematical practice Incompleteness theorem In this paper I shall consider two related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly, Gödel’s paradox which leads to a contradiction within mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of completeness and consistency established by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. By bringing in considerations from the philosophy of mathematical practice on informal proofs, I suggest that we should add to the two axes of completeness and consistency a third axis of formality and informality. I use this perspective to respond to the arguments for the inconsistency of mathematics made by Beall and Priest, presenting problems with the assumptions needed concerning formalisation, the unity of informal mathematics and the relation between the formal and informal. 2016-12-03T00:00:00Z Text Chapter 2134/9589094.v1 https://figshare.com/articles/chapter/Saving_proof_from_paradox_G_del_s_paradox_and_the_inconsistency_of_informal_mathematics/9589094 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
spellingShingle Formal system
Formal language
Mathematical reasoning
Mathematical practice
Incompleteness theorem
Fenner Tanswell
Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title_full Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title_fullStr Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title_full_unstemmed Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title_short Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
title_sort saving proof from paradox: gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics
topic Formal system
Formal language
Mathematical reasoning
Mathematical practice
Incompleteness theorem
url https://hdl.handle.net/2134/9589094.v1