Market Entry, Fighting Brands, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from the French Mobile Telecommunications Market

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents’ fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. In...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2021-11, Vol.111 (11), p.3459-3499
Main Authors: Bourreau, Marc, Sun, Yutec, Verboven, Frank
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!