The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: a reply to Benn

As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2022-07, Vol.179 (7), p.2155-2166
Main Authors: Fileva, Iskra, Tresan, Jonathan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible but not required—cannot be the sort of optionality involved in supererogation. As an alternative, she offers a novel account of the optionality of supererogatory acts: the “comparative cost” account. In this paper, we rebut Benn’s objection to the common view that supererogation involves optionality as standardly understood. We also point out that her objection, if it worked, would equally undermine her own comparative cost proposal.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-021-01756-4