An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for n-Per...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:SERIEs : journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2010-09, Vol.1 (4), p.475-487
Main Authors: Hu, Cheng-Cheng, Yang, Yi-You
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic Policy
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
externalities
Externer Effekt
Kooperatives Spiel
marginal contributions
Microeconomics
Original Article
Public Finance
shapley value
Shapley-Wert
Theorie
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Summary:An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for n-Person games. In: Kuhn H, Tucker A (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we discuss a relationship between the a-Shapley values proposed by Fujinaka (On the marginality principle in partition function form games. Mimeo, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Japan, 2004) and the values constructed through the average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007).
ISSN:1869-4195
1869-4187
1869-4195
DOI:10.1007/s13209-009-0004-9