A game-theoretic model of curriculum integration and school leadership

This paper analyzes a simple game-theoretic model of curriculum integration decision-making in a high school with academic and vocational tracks. The model is based on a formal theory of how curriculum integration affects learning. Teachers choose to include a curriculum integration unit in their cl...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics of education review 2006-04, Vol.25 (2), p.189-199
Main Author: Stull, William J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Allgemeinbildung
Berufsbildung
Curriculum
Decision Making
Doppelqualifikation
Educational Administration
Educational Change
Educational economics
Efficiency
Game Theory
High School
High Schools
Human capital
Instructional Leadership
Integrated Curriculum
Lehrer
Lerntheorie
Qualität
Resource allocation
Schulkultur
Schulleistung
Schulleiter
Spiel
Teacher Attitudes
Teaching Methods
Theorie
USA
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Summary:This paper analyzes a simple game-theoretic model of curriculum integration decision-making in a high school with academic and vocational tracks. The model is based on a formal theory of how curriculum integration affects learning. Teachers choose to include a curriculum integration unit in their classes only when it increases learning relative to the next best alternative. The analysis shows that (1) curriculum integration is not invariably the right choice for schools; (2) teachers may independently choose curriculum integration under certain circumstances; (3) teachers' independent choices about curriculum integration may or may not be optimal from a school-wide perspective; and (4) school leadership is called for when teacher choices are suboptimal. (DIPF/Orig.).
ISSN:0272-7757
1873-7382
DOI:10.1016/j.econedurev.2005.01.006