Bank-affiliated directors' monitoring, earnings management, and financial reporting quality in emerging markets: Evidence from India

• Published in: Emerging markets review 2024-09, Vol.62, p.101184, Article 101184
• Main Authors: Jadiyappa, Nemiraja, Hickman, L. Emily, Shrivastav, Santosh Kumar, Rajpal, Hanish, Kaur, Navneet
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Bank-affiliated directors; Corporate governance; creditors' monitoring; Earnings management; Financial reporting quality
• ISSN: 1566-0141
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2024.101184

In this novel investigation of creditor governance in an emerging market, this paper examines the monitoring by Indian lenders of firms' earnings management and financial reporting quality through the appointment of a bank-affiliated director to the borrower's board. Specifically, we study the effect of having a bank-affiliated director on the board (a “BDB”), prior to the implementation of India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). This setting represents a business environment characterized by underdeveloped financial institutions, a weak legal system, and inefficient bankruptcy resolutions. Unlike the U.S., where BDBs play a limited monitoring role, our evidence suggests bank-affiliated directors played an active role in firm governance and lowered earnings management as well as improving financial reporting quality in India during the period of our study. Specifically, we find lower discretionary accruals among firms with BDBs in cross-sectional, pre-post, performance matched, and propensity score matched analyses – signaling higher reporting quality and less earnings management. This finding holds after controlling for endogeneity and when measures of accounting conservatism or earnings persistence are utilized as additional measures of reporting quality. Further, the dampening effect of BDBs on discretionary accruals is more pronounced for companies subject to greater information asymmetry and those prone to agency problems. In addition, firms with BDBs on the board have less volatile ROAs and lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with BDBs encouraging borrowers to pursue less risky investments to safeguard creditors' interests. As the first examination of the monitoring influence of BDBs on financial reporting quality – and earnings management in particular – in an emerging market, our results provide unique insights for policymakers and creditors seeking to enhance governance and reporting quality of firms in evolving business environments. •We study the impact of bank-affiliated directors on boards (BDB) of Indian firms.•Pre-IBC reform, BDB firms had lower discretionary accruals in multiple analyses.•Stronger effect among firms with greater information asymmetry or agency problems.•BDB firms also had more conservative accounting and more persistent earnings.•Results suggest monitoring by BDB enhanced financial reporting quality, pre-IBC.