Lying in competitive environments: Identifying behavioral impacts

Incentive schemes based on relative performance provide high effort incentives, but may backfire by increasing incentives for misconduct. Previous literature supports this view by demonstrating that, as compared to individual incentive schemes based on absolute performance only, highly competitive e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European economic review 2024-11, Vol.170, p.104844, Article 104844
Main Authors: Dato, Simon, Feess, Eberhard, Nieken, Petra
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cheating
Competition
Contest
Lying
Private information
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Summary:Incentive schemes based on relative performance provide high effort incentives, but may backfire by increasing incentives for misconduct. Previous literature supports this view by demonstrating that, as compared to individual incentive schemes based on absolute performance only, highly competitive environments are associated with higher degrees of lying and cheating. However, it is not clear if this is (mainly) driven by stronger financial incentives or by competition per se and its behavioral effects. We conduct an online experiment with competitive and individual incentive schemes in which the financial incentives to lie are held constant. From a behavioral perspective, a competitive environment may increase the willingness for misconduct via a desire-to-win, but may also decrease it via the negative payoff externality on competitors. Our results provide evidence of a significant lying-enhancing desire-to-win-effect and an insignificant lying-reducing negative externality effect.
ISSN:0014-2921
DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104844