Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities

Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2024-09, Vol.147, p.148-169
Main Authors: Haucap, Justus, Heldman, Christina, Rau, Holger A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collusion
Cooperation
Experiment
Gender differences
Negative externality
Social information
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Summary:Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate less often independently of the degree of information they receive. No gender difference is found absent negative externalities.
ISSN:0899-8256
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.007