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Optimal Attack Strategy Against Fault Detectors for Linear Cyber-Physical Systems
•A new technical scheme for the optimal false data injection attacks against fault detection is proposed, and the robustness to the fault detection performance of the cyber-physical system is enhanced on the proposed attack strategy by using H- scheme.•Different from the existing optimal attack stra...
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Published in: | Information sciences 2021-12, Vol.581, p.390-402 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | •A new technical scheme for the optimal false data injection attacks against fault detection is proposed, and the robustness to the fault detection performance of the cyber-physical system is enhanced on the proposed attack strategy by using H- scheme.•Different from the existing optimal attack strategies that are established based on sufficient conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions are established to maximize the degradation of the fault detection performance and robustness of cyber-physical system while maintaining stealth.
This paper is concerned with the design of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against fault detectors (FD) for linear cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The purpose of the attacker is to design an stealthy attack scheme such that the defenders cannot detect the faults in time or fail to detect the faults, and at the same time the robustness of the CPS is deteriorated. Unlike the existing optimal attack strategies (OASs) that are established based on sufficient conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions (NASCs) are established to maximize the degradation of the FD performance and robustness of CPS while maintaining stealth. Subsequently, an OAS is constructed by solving coupled backward recursive Riccati difference equations (RDEs). Finally, two simulation examples are employed to show the effectiveness of the designed attack scheme. |
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ISSN: | 0020-0255 1872-6291 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.ins.2021.09.042 |