Allocators are more prosocial when affected agents can visually eavesdrop

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization 2024-12, Vol.228, p.106772, Article 106772
• Main Authors: Wang, Stephanie W., Camerer, Colin F.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Attention; Observability; Social image; Social preferences
• ISSN: 0167-2681
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106772

•We study binary social allocation decisions where the payoffs for the chooser and others in the group are initially hidden and can only be revealed by mouse clicks.•We use a screensharing technique where one group member can observe the chooser's clicks in real-time to study the effect of social image on attention and choices.•We find that this increase in observability increases the time choosers spent looking at the potential payoffs to the observer and reduces selfish choices, contrary to the “willful ignorance” hypothesis. In these experiments, participants made binary choices in “dictator” games choosing distributions for themselves and others. All payoffs are initially hidden and can be clicked open using a mouse. To study the effect of social image on attention and choices, we used a novel screensharing technique: One of the participants receiving the chooser's allocation can observe the chooser's clicks, so they can see if the chooser is looking up what the impact will be on their own allocation (but they cannot observe the chooser's choices). This change in observability increases the possible impact of social image concerns on expressed social preferences. It increases the time choosers spend looking at the potential payoffs to the observer and makes their choices less selfish. This finding goes against the hypothesis of “willful ignorance” and suggests other behavioral influences.