The king can do no wrong: On the criminal immunity of leaders

In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of public economics 2019-02, Vol.170, p.15-26
Main Authors: Che, Jiahua, Chung, Kim-Sau, Qiao, Xue
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Autocracy
Corruption
Hostage motive
Leader immunity
Party elites
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Summary:In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the “right” time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy—an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity. •We study models of non-democracies (such as China) where leaders have and do not have criminal immunity.•We discuss the costs and benefits of stripping leaders their criminal immunity in such political regimes.•We discuss what it takes to reap the benefits without incurring the costs.
ISSN:0047-2727
1879-2316
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.008