Policy changes resulting in power changes? Quantitative evidence from 25 years of forest policy development in Bangladesh

• Published in: Land use policy 2018-01, Vol.70, p.419-431
• Main Authors: Rahman, Md Saifur, Sarker, Pradip Kumar, Sadath, Md. Nazmus, Giessen, Lukas
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Bangladesh; Dependent variable; Distribution of power; Forest policy; International influences; Policy change; Symbolic and substantive policy change
• ISSN: 0264-8377; 1873-5754
• DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.11.029

•The study analyzes the consequences of policy changes on the power of the main bureaucratic actors.•The study employs the forest policy sector of Bangladesh as a case.•The study analyzes 25 years of forest policy changes.•It provides insight into the distribution of power for policy formation.•Our finding suggest that both, substantive as well as symbolic policy changes bring about power gainsOur finding suggest that both, substantive as well as symbolic policy changes bring about power gains. A remarkable research program exists conceptualizing policy change as dependent variable, and inquiring on factors causing it. A question so far neglected by political science is: to which extent does policy change as independent variable also lead to power changes among key policy actors so they can facilitate and flank those changes? Before this background this study aims to analyze the consequences of 25 years of policy changes on the power of the main bureaucratic actors in a particular policy field. Conceptually we draw on bureaucratic politics, power and relative gains theories and the concept of substantial vs. symbolic policy change. Empirically we focus on all substantive as well as symbolic policy changes within the forest policy sector in Bangladesh between 1989 and 2014. Our finding suggest that over 25 years both, substantive as well as symbolic policy changes bring about power gains for (i) subject-specific sectoral administrations, including multi-sectoral district authorities, who gain power to the largest extent, (ii) cross-cutting general bureaucracies on finance and planning, and (iii) foreign donor administrations. We conclude that esp. sectoral bureaucracies are very sensitive and knowledgeable about the power implications of policy changes specific to their fields of expertise and, hence, are able to follow a more efficient power strategy than their cross-cutting counterparts.