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Study of game models and the complex dynamics of a low-carbon supply chain with an altruistic retailer under consumers’ low-carbon preference
This paper incorporates the retailer’s altruistic behavior into the low-carbon supply chain considering consumers’ low-carbon preference and establishes the Stackelberg game model and the vertical Nash game model from the perspectives of a static game and a dynamic game, respectively. First, the sta...
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Published in: | Physica A 2019-08, Vol.528, p.121460, Article 121460 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper incorporates the retailer’s altruistic behavior into the low-carbon supply chain considering consumers’ low-carbon preference and establishes the Stackelberg game model and the vertical Nash game model from the perspectives of a static game and a dynamic game, respectively. First, the static analytical solutions of two models are obtained. Second, we explore the impacts of the retailer’s preference for altruism, consumers’ low-carbon preference and decision parameters on the complex nonlinear dynamic behaviors of the two models. The results show that the retailer’s altruistic behavior and consumers’ low-carbon preference narrow the stability region of the system. In the two game models, the retailer’s altruistic behavior always benefits the manufacture, but it is not good for the retailer; it is either beneficial to or not conducive for the whole supply chain. It is easier to make the system lose stability by accelerating the price adjustment parameter than by adjusting the carbon emission rate parameter. The higher adjustment parameter is even worse for the leader (the manufacturer) in the Stackelberg game, while in the vertical Nash game it is worse for the retailer. In addition, in the dynamic Stackelberg game, we are very surprised to find that a moderate consumer low-carbon preference is beneficial, but an excessive consumer low-carbon preference is not conducive to decision makers.
•Retailers’ altruistic behavior can boost manufacturers to reduce carbon emission.•Increasing consumers’ low-carbon preference does not always benefit decision makers.•Retailers’ altruistic behavior narrows the stability region of the system.•Accelerating price adjustment parameters is easier to make systems lose stability. |
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ISSN: | 0378-4371 1873-2119 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.physa.2019.121460 |