The willingness to pay for voice in dictator games

•Communication is often vital for cooperation but tends to be costly.•We report findings about recipients’ willingness to pay for voice in dictator games.•We find that people grossly underestimate the true value of voice.•We find that people are particularly skeptical of ex-post communication. Voice...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 2023-12, Vol.107, p.102117, Article 102117
Main Authors: Langenbach, Pascal, Friehe, Tim
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Communication
Dictator game
Social preferences
Willingness to pay
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Summary:•Communication is often vital for cooperation but tends to be costly.•We report findings about recipients’ willingness to pay for voice in dictator games.•We find that people grossly underestimate the true value of voice.•We find that people are particularly skeptical of ex-post communication. Voice is valuable in relationships, but how much are people willing to pay for it? This paper reports findings about recipients’ willingness to pay for voice in standard dictator games. From our data, we obtain two key findings: first, people underestimate the true value of voice and, second, they are particularly skeptical of the value of voice after an irrevocable allocation decision has already been made (i.e., people underrate the benefits from anticipated messages).
ISSN:2214-8043
DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102117